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Paul D.  Butler 
 
Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights   
abstract.  A low income person is more likely to be prosecuted and imprisoned  
post-Gideon than pre-Gideon.  Poor people lose in American criminal justice not because they 
have ineffective lawyers but because they are selectively targeted by police, prosecutors, and law 
makers. The critique of rights suggests that rights are indeterminate and regressive. Gideon 
demonstrates this critique: it has not improved the situation of most poor people, and in some 
ways has worsened their plight. Gideon provides a degree of legitimacy for the status quo. Even 
full enforcement of Gideon would not significantly improve the loser status of low-income people 
in American criminal justice. 
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introduction 
Gideon v. Wainwright1 is widely regarded as a milestone in American 
criminal justice. When it was decided in 1963, it was seen as a major step 
forward in assuring fairness to poor people and racial minorities. Yet, fifty 
years later, low-income and African-American people in the criminal justice 
system are considerably worse off. It would be preferable to be a poor black 
charged with a crime in 1962 than now, if one’s objective is to avoid prison or 
serve as little time as possible. 
The “critique of rights,” as articulated by critical legal theorists, posits that 
“nothing whatever follows from a court’s adoption of some legal rule”2 and 
that “winning a legal victory can actually impede further progressive change.”3 
My thesis is that Gideon demonstrates the critique of rights. Arguably, Gideon 
has not improved the situation of accused persons, and may even have 
worsened their plight.  
The reason that prisons are filled with poor people, and that rich people 
rarely go to prison, is not because the rich have better lawyers than the poor. It 
is because prison is for the poor, and not the rich. In criminal cases poor people 
lose most of the time, not because indigent defense is inadequately funded, 
although it is, and not because defense attorneys for poor people are 
ineffective, although some are. Poor people lose, most of the time, because in 
American criminal justice, poor people are losers. Prison is designed for them. 
This is the real crisis of indigent defense. Gideon obscures this reality, and in 
this sense stands in the way of the political mobilization that will be required to 
transform criminal justice. 
I know that, for some readers, these claims are counterintuitive, and I ask 
these readers’ indulgence for the time it takes to read this Essay, in which I will 
attempt to prove my claims. It is also important to emphasize that I am not 
making a “but-for” claim of causation. Gideon is not responsible for the 
exponential increase in incarceration or the vast rise in racial disparities in 
criminal justice. As I explain later, however, Gideon bears some responsibility 
for legitimating these developments and diffusing political resistance to them. 
It invests the criminal justice system with a veneer of impartiality and 
 
 
1. 327 U.S. 335 (1963). 
2. Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 32 (1993). Tushnet refers to this 
component of the critique of rights as the “indeterminacy thesis.” 
3. Id. at 26. 
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respectability that it does not deserve. Gideon created the false consciousness 
that criminal justice would get better. It actually got worse. Even full 
enforcement of Gideon would not significantly improve the wretchedness of 
American criminal justice. 
In Lafler v. Cooper4 and Missouri v. Frye,5 the Supreme Court extended the 
right to counsel to the plea bargaining stage of prosecution. Some people are 
having a Gideon moment6: the Court’s rulings seem like important victories for 
indigent accused persons because, as Justice Kennedy observed in Lafler, 
“criminal justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials.”7 It seems cynical and defeatist to recall Mark Tushnet’s observation that 
“nothing whatever follows from a court’s adoption of some legal rule.”8 But 
one goal of this Essay is to disrupt the “cruel optimism” that Gideon discourse 
creates.  
This Essay proceeds as follows. The first Part develops the claim that the 
poor—especially poor African Americans—are “losers” in American criminal 
justice and that providing them with more, or better, defense attorneys would 
not substantially alter their subordination. Part II describes the critique of 
rights, and Part III applies it to Gideon. Part IV compares the critique of rights 
to other comments on rights discourse in criminal procedure. The Essay 
concludes with some recommendations on what advocates for poor people 
might do that would help them more than discoursing about rights.  
i .  how poor people lose in american criminal justice 
Indigent persons are much more likely to go to prison today than in the era 
when Gideon was decided. In 1960, the U.S. imprisonment rate was 
approximately 126 per 100,000 population.9 By, 2008, the rate had quadrupled, 
 
 
4. 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
5. 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
6. See Adam Liptak, Justices’ Ruling Expands Rights of Accused in Plea Bargains, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/22/us/supreme-court-says-defendants 
-have-right-to-good-lawyers.html. 
7. 132 S. Ct. at 1388. 
8. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 32. 
9. Margaret Werner Cahalan, Historical Corrections Statistics in the United States, 1850-1984, 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 30 (1986), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/pr/102529.pdf. 
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to 504 per 100,000.10  
African-American defendants are even worse off. In 1960, three years 
before Gideon, the black incarceration rate was approximately 660 per 
100,000.11 By 1970, it had fallen some, to slightly under 600 per 100,000.12 In 
2010, the rate of incarceration among black males was an astronomical 3,074 
per 100,000.13  
For men hoping to avoid prison, being both poor and black is a lethal 
combination. More than two-thirds of black males who do not have college 
degrees will be incarcerated at some point in their lives.14 Black male high 
school dropouts are more likely to be imprisoned than employed.15 
What is it about being poor and African American that substantially 
increases the risk of incarceration? The answer, rather obviously, has much to 
do with class and race and, less obviously, little to do with the quality of the 
indigent defense system. This Essay employs data about both race and class to 
demonstrate this claim, but at the start I want to note that it is impossible to 
disaggregate the effects of race and class. The answer to the questions, “Are 
poor defendants treated unfairly because many of them are black, are black 
defendants treated unfairly because many of them are poor, or is there some 
other dynamic at work?” is “yes.”16 Indeed, the Gideon decision itself was 
 
 
10. William J. Sabol, Heather C. West & Matthew Cooper, Prisoners in 2008, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. 6 (2009), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p08.pdf. 
11. See Margaret Cahalan, Trends in Incarceration in the United States Since 1880: A Summary of 
Reported Rates and the Distribution of Offenses, 25 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 9, 40 tbl.11 (1979) 
(reporting that there were 125,000 black adult inmates in the U.S. in 1960); Race for the 
United States, Regions, Divisions, and States: 1960, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2002), 
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA-08.pdf (stating 
that the U.S. black population in 1960 was 18,871,831). 
12. See Cahalan, supra note 11, at 40 tbl.11 (reporting that 134,000 black adult inmates in the 
U.S. in 1970); Race for the United States, Regions, Divisions, and States: 1970, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU (2002), http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0056/tabA 
-05.pdf (stating that the U.S. black population in 1970 was 22,580,289). 
13. Paul Guerino, Paige M. Harrison & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2010, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. 27 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf. 
14. Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, 
at 8, 16. 
15. Id. at 12. 
16. For a discussion of the problems and benefits of analyzing modalities of subordination, see 
Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139, 166-67; and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: 
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explicitly a class intervention, but implicitly, like other Warren court criminal 
procedure cases, a racial justice intervention as well.17 
Approximately two decades after Gideon, two trends began in criminal 
justice, the effects of which were to overwhelm any benefits that Gideon 
provided to low-income accused persons. First, the United States experienced 
the most pronounced increase in incarceration in the history of the world.18 
Second, there was a corresponding exponential increase in racial disparities in 
incarceration.  
This dramatic expansion of incarceration was accomplished on the backs of 
poor people. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that the “generally 
accepted indigency rate” for state felony cases near the time when Gideon was 
decided was 43%.19 Today approximately 80% of people charged with crime are 
poor.20 
Other data further illustrate the correlation between poverty and 
incarceration. In 1997, more than half of state prisoners earned less than 
$1,000 in the month before their arrest.21 This would result in an annual 
income of less than $12,000, well below the $25,654 median per capita income 
in 1997.22 The same year, 35% of state inmates were unemployed in the month 
before their arrest, compared to the national unemployment rate of 4.9%.23 
Approximately 70% of state prisoners have not graduated from high 
                                                                                                                                               
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988) 
[hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment]. 
17. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980); Michael J. Klarman, The 
Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 763-66 (1991); Carol S. 
Steiker, Second Thoughts about First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 838-52 (1994); see also 
William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 
107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997) (“Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of 
antidiscrimination law.”). 
18. See Adam Gopnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30 
/120130crat_atlarge_gopnik (“Mass incarceration on a scale almost unexampled in human 
history is a fundamental fact of our country today . . . .”). 
19. Stuntz, supra note 17, at 7 n.7. 
20. Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006). 
21. Caroline Wolf Harlow, Education and Correctional Populations, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 1, 10 & 
tbl.14 (2003), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf. 
22. Per Capita Personal Income by State, BUREAU OF BUS. & ECON. RES., http://bber.unm.edu 
/econ/us-pci.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2013). 
23. Harlow, supra note 21, at 1, 10. 
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school.24 Only 13% of incarcerated adults have any post-high school education, 
compared with almost 50% of the non-incarcerated population.25  
College graduation, on the other hand, serves to insulate Americans from 
incarceration. Only 0.1% of bachelor’s degree holders are incarcerated, 
compared to 6.3% of high school dropouts.26 Put another way, high school 
dropouts are sixty-three times more likely to be locked up than college 
graduates.  
The post-Gideon expansion of the prison population was also accomplished 
on the backs of black people. There have been always been racial disparities in 
American criminal justice, but from the 1920s through the 1970s they were 
“only” about two-to-one.27 Now the black/white incarceration disparity is 
seven-to-one.28 There are more African Americans under correctional 
supervision than there were slaves in 1850.29 As Michelle Alexander states, “If 
mass incarceration is considered as a system of social control—specifically, 
racial control—then the system is a fantastic success.”30  
In summary, poor people and blacks have never fared as well as the 
nonpoor and the nonblack in American criminal justice. Since the 1970s, 
however, the disparities have gotten much worse. Something happened that 
dramatically increased incarceration and dramatically raised the percentage of 
the incarcerated who are poor and black. What happened is usually attributed 
to two main causes: the war on drugs and the law-and-order or so-called 
tough-on-crime policies of American leaders since the Nixon Administration.31  
 
 
24. Id. at 1. 
25. Id. at 1-2 & tbl.1. 
26. Andrew Sum, Ishwar Khatiwada & Joseph McLaughlin, The Consequences of Dropping Out of 
High School: Joblessness and Jailing for High School Dropouts and the High Cost for Taxpayers 10 
(Ctr. for Labor Mkt. Studies Publ’ns, Paper No. 23, 2009), http://hdl.handle.net 
/2047/d20000596. 
27. Pamela E. Oliver & Marino A. Bruce, Tracking the Causes and Consequences of  
Racial Disparities in Imprisonment 2-3 (2001) (unpublished project proposal  
to the National Science Foundation), http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/~oliver/RACIAL/Reports 
/nsfAug01narrative.pdf.  
28. Heather C. West, Prison Inmates at Midyear 2009—Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT. 
21 tbl.18 (2010), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pim09st.pdf. 
29. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLORBLINDNESS 271 n.7 (2010). 
30. Id. at 225. 
31. See id. at 271 n.7; see also WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
136 (2011) (describing the period between Reconstruction and the Great Depression, and 
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Thus far I have made the case that prisons are populated by people who are 
disproportionately poor and African American. My next step is to demonstrate 
that this is not a coincidence, in order to further support the claim that the 
poor are losers in American criminal justice.  
Mass incarceration’s process of control—the social and legal apparatus by 
which poor people become losers in criminal justice—can be broken into five 
steps. 
 
(1)  The spaces that poor people, especially poor African Americans, live in 
receive more law enforcement in the form of police stops and arrests.32 
 
(2) The criminal law deliberately ignores the social conditions that breed 
some forms of law-breaking.33 Deprivations associated with poverty are 
usually not “defenses” to criminal liability, although they may be factors 
considered in sentencing. 
 
(3) African Americans, who are disproportionately poor, are the target of 
explicit and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice system, 
including police, prosecutors,34 and judges.35  
                                                                                                                                               
noting that “racial bias, though real and powerful, was . . . weaker than one might imagine” 
and that “nothing comparable to the massive racial tilt in today’s drug prisoner population 
existed in the Gilded Age North”).  
32. See Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design: The War on Drugs, Race, and 
the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 SOC. RES. 445 (2006); Tracey Meares, Place 
and Crime, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1998). For an argument that the African-American 
community actually benefits from more law enforcement, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, 
CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997), and for a critique of this argument, see Paul Butler, (Color) 
Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1270 (1998) 
(reviewing KENNEDY, supra). 
33. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); Richard Delgado, 
“Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a Defense of Severe 
Environmental Deprivation?, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 9, 9-10 (1985); see also Jones v. City of Los 
Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1120 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment a Los Angeles ordinance criminalizing “sitting, lying, or sleeping on public 
streets and sidewalks at all times and in all places”), vacated because of settlement, 505 F.3d 
1006 (2007); United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923, 957-65 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, 
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a “rotten social background” defense and corresponding jury 
instruction may be appropriate in some cases). 
34. See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 3-42 
(1997). 
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(4) Once any person is arrested, she becomes part of a crime control system 
of criminal justice, in which guilt is presumed.36 Prosecutors, using the 
legal apparatus of expansive criminal liability, recidivist statutes, and 
mandatory minimums,37 coerce guilty pleas by threatening defendants with 
vastly disproportionate punishment if they go to trial.38 
 
(5) Repeat the cycle. A criminal caste is created. Two-thirds of freed 
prisoners are rearrested, and half return to prison, within three years of 
                                                                                                                                               
35. Prosecutors are more likely to charge black suspects than whites, even controlling for factors 
like prior criminal record. See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit 
Racial Bias on the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 806 (2012). 
While African Americans do not disproportionately use or sell drugs, they are over one-third 
of those arrested for drug crimes. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DECADES OF DISPARITY: DRUG 
ARRESTS AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TARGETING 
BLACKS: DRUG ENFORCEMENT AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 41-44 (2008). Research 
on implicit bias suggests that blacks are more likely to be suspected of crime, convicted, and 
punished for longer than others. For a summary of this research, see Smith & Levinson, 
supra, at 800-01; see also ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 103-05 (surveying research on racial 
bias and criticizing the Supreme Court for “adopting rules that would maximize—not 
minimize—the amount of racial discrimination that would likely occur”). 
36. Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 11 (1964). 
37. The Supreme Court has blessed this practice. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978), 
Paul Hayes was charged with uttering a forged instrument in the amount of $88.30. The 
maximum sentence for the offense was ten years, and the prosecutor offered to recommend 
a five-year sentence in exchange for a guilty plea. The prosecutor also indicated that if there 
was no guilty plea, he would charge Mr. Hayes under a recidivist statute that would require 
a life sentence if Mr. Hayes was convicted. Mr. Hayes turned down the plea, the prosecutor 
won his conviction, and Mr. Hayes received a life sentence. Id. at 358-59. The Supreme 
Court found no constitutional violation, although it stated that “the breadth of discretion 
that our country’s legal system vests in prosecuting attorneys carries with it the potential for 
both individual and institutional abuse.” Id. at 365. For a powerful critique of prosecutorial 
abuse of discretion in the plea-bargaining process, see Jonathan A. Rapping, Who’s 
Guarding the Henhouse? How the American Prosecutor Came To Devour Those He Is Sworn To 
Protect, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 513 (2012). 
38. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 18 (1978) (“The 
modern public prosecutor commands the vast resources of the state for gathering and 
generating accusing evidence. We allowed him this power in large part because the criminal 
trial interposed the safeguard of adjudication against the danger that he might bring those 
resources to bear against an innocent citizen—whether on account of honest error, 
arbitrariness, or worse. But the plea bargaining system has largely dissolved that 
safeguard.”).  
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their release.39 
 
This description is not intended to be novel, or especially provocative. 
Other observers of American criminal justice have made similar points about 
the process by which being poor and African American increases the risk of 
incarceration. Richard S. Frase, for example, writes that 
poverty and lack of opportunity are associated with higher crime rates; 
crime leads to arrest, a criminal record, and usually a jail or prison 
sentence; past crimes lengthen those sentences; offenders released from 
prison or jail confront family and neighborhood dysfunction, increased 
risks of unemployment, and other crime-producing disadvantages; this 
make them likelier to commit new crimes, and the cycle repeats itself.40  
Michelle Alexander notes:  
It is simply taken for granted that, in cities like Baltimore and Chicago, 
the vast majority of young black men are currently under the control of 
the criminal justice system or branded criminals for life. This 
extraordinary circumstance—unheard of in the rest of the world—is 
treated here in America as a basic fact of life, as normal as separate 
water fountains were just a half century ago.41  
What if every person accused of a crime had an excellent lawyer? 
Proponents of Gideon suggest it would be an important step in making criminal 
justice more equitable. For example, David Cole writes that the “story of the 
enforcement of the right to counsel suggests that our failure to make good on 
Gideon’s promise is no mere mistake. Rather, it is the single most important 
mechanism by which the courts and society ensure a double standard in 
constitutional rights protection in the criminal law.”42  
In reality, full enforcement of Gideon probably would not significantly 
impact the “double standard.” If mass incarceration and racial disparities were 
caused by poor defense attorneys, it would make sense to think of Gideon as the 
 
 
39. Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, BUREAU OF JUST. 
STAT. 7 tbl.8 (2002), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
40. Richard S. Frase, What Explains Persistent Racial Disproportionality in Minnesota’s Prison and 
Jail Populations?, 38 CRIME & JUST. 201, 263 (2009). 
41. ALEXANDER, supra note 29, at 176. 
42. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 65 (1999). 
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appropriate solution. But, as the five-step process described above 
demonstrates, defenders are not the cause.  
I want to be careful not to discount the difference that an excellent defense 
attorney can make, and how much this matters for individual clients. At the 
same time, I don’t want to overclaim, as I believe Professor Cole does, that full 
enforcement of Gideon would bring anything remotely resembling equality to 
American criminal justice. 
Empirical evidence of whether attorney ability makes a difference in trial 
outcomes is inconclusive. An important study by James M. Anderson and Paul 
Heaton suggests that public defenders in Philadelphia, compared to appointed 
counsel, “reduce their clients’ murder conviction rate by 19%. They reduce the 
probability that their clients receive a life sentence by 62%. Public defenders 
reduce overall time served in prison by 24%.”43 Another study by David Abrams 
and Albert Yoon suggests that “going from the tenth to ninetieth percentile of 
public defender ability decreases the defendant’s expected sentence length by 
5.8 months. . . . Clearly, the public defender to whom a defendant is 
assigned . . . has a significant impact on how much time the defendant will 
serve.”44 But another empirical study found that “the skill level of the defense 
attorney plays no role in determining the outcome of a criminal trial in everyday 
cases with non-celebrity defendants.”45 
There is indirect evidence from courts that the scale of punishment of the 
poor would not be reduced by more effective lawyers. In Strickland v. 
Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-pronged test to determine 
ineffective assistance of counsel.46 First, the counsel’s representation must fall 
below an “objective standard of reasonableness.”47 Second, there must be a 
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result 
of the proceeding would have been different.”48  
In practice the tests rarely leads to a finding of ineffectiveness. I do not 
want to suggest that the Strickland test is the appropriate measure of effective 
 
 
43. James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The Effect of 
Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 159 (2012). 
44. David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random Case Assignment To 
Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1166-67 (2007). 
45. Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Note, Slipping Away from Justice: The Effect of Attorney Skill on Trial 
Outcomes, 63 VAND. L. REV. 267, 291 (2010).  
46. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
47. Id. at 688. 
48. Id. at 694. 
   
poor people lose 
2187 
 
assistance.49 I do want to suggest, however, that courts are probably correctly 
applying the test. As stated above, the most favorable empirical evidence 
suggests that more able defenders reduce average sentences by 24%. For 
individual defendants, this reduction is very important. But even with a 24% 
reduction in every sentence, American criminal justice would remain the 
harshest and most punitive in the world. The poor, and especially poor people 
of color, are its primary victims. 
i i .  the critique of rights 50 
Robin West has described the critique of rights as “one of the most vibrant, 
important, counterintuitive, challenging set of ideas that emerged from the 
legal academy over the course of the last quarter of the twentieth century.”51 
Many of these ideas were articulated as part of the critical legal studies 
movement that began in the 1980s.52 In a seminal 1984 article, Mark Tushnet 
described rights as unstable, indeterminate, overly abstract, and politically 
harmful to the Left.53 The critique of rights was intended as an “act of creative 
destruction that may help us build societies that transcend the failures of 
 
 
49. According to the National Right to Counsel Committee, a blue-ribbon panel that evaluated 
the indigent counsel system, “Since Strickland was decided, commentators have been 
virtually unanimous in their criticisms of the opinion.” NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 40-41 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org 
/pdf/139.pdf. The critiques of Strickland have focused on the difficulty defendants have in 
proving that their cases would have come out differently had their lawyers performed better. 
Courts usually hold that they would not have. 
50. For seminal texts making the critique of rights, see Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-
Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1984); Duncan 
Kennedy, The Critique of Rights in Critical Legal Studies, in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 178 
(Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002); and Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. 
L. REV. 1363 (1984). 
51. Robin L. West, Tragic Rights: The Rights Critique in the Age of Obama, 53 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 713, 715 (2011). 
52. For a longer description and intellectual history of the critique of rights, see Kennedy, supra 
note 50.  
53. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 1363-64. Tushnet’s critique was contextual, i.e., based on how 
rights function in the United States. He observed: “[T]here is nothing odd about saying 
that rights in Poland are a good thing, while rights in the United States are not. They are, 
after all, different cultures.” Id. at 1382. 
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capitalism.”54  
The critique of rights has evolved to many sets of critiques.55 One 
description on a website curated by a group of legal theorists who teach or have 
taught at Harvard Law School summarizes five basic elements: 
 
(1)  The discourse of rights is less useful in securing progressive social 
change than liberal theorists and politicians assume. 
 
(2)  Legal rights are in fact indeterminate and incoherent. 
 
(3) The use of rights discourse stunts human imagination and mystifies 
people about how law really works. 
 
(4) At least as prevailing in American law, the discourse of rights reflects 
and produces a kind of isolated individualism that hinders social solidarity 
and genuine human connection. 
 
(5) Rights discourse can actually impede progressive movement for 
genuine democracy and justice.56  
 
Most of the critiques make the claim that rights are indeterminate. The 
proposition is that “the law is not a fixed and determined system, but rather an 
unruly miscellany of various, multifaceted, contradictory practices, altering 
from time to time and from context to context as different facets of law are 
privileged or suppressed.”57 Robin West describes the indeterminacy thesis as 
meaning that “the articulation of an interest as a ‘right’ by no means creates an 
unmoveable bulwark against change, interference, or recalibration of the 
protection of the various interests . . . toward which it so desperately strives.”58 
 
 
54. Id. at 1363 (footnote omitted). 
55. See, e.g., West, supra note 51, at 716 (describing a “three-prong rights critique . . . that U.S. 
constitutional rights politically insulate and valorize subordination, legitimate and thus 
perpetuate greater injustices than they address, and socially alienate us from community”). 
56. Critical Perspectives on Rights, BRIDGE, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/bridge/CriticalTheory 
/rights.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2013). 
57. Robert Gordon, Some Critical Theories of Law and Their Critics, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 641, 
655 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998). 
58. ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 126 (2011). 
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Rights are indeterminate because they are too abstract to be useful in deciding 
particular cases, or because they conflict with other rights. When social 
progress occurs after a right is declared, it is because of the social and political 
context in which the right is declared rather than the right itself.  
Most critiques also claim that rights are regressive. Winning a “right” in a 
court case either has no connection to advancing a political goal, or actually 
impedes political goals.59 Gary Peller, for example, faults rights discourse for 
constituting “a narrative of legitimation, a language for concluding that 
particular social practices are fair because they are objective and unbiased.”60 
Rights impede progressive change because they divert attention and resources 
away from material deprivations, and, according to some theorists, because 
rights are individual, rather than about the welfare of groups.61  
Some critical race theorists “acknowledg[e] and affirm[ ] . . . that rights 
may be unstable and indeterminate” but still provide a limited defense of 
them.62 Patricia Williams, for example, maintains that “rights rhetoric has been 
and continues to be an effective form of discourse for blacks.”63 In this view 
rights build solidarity among rights holders,64 give voice to the previously 
voiceless,65 and stigmatize subordination.66 Likewise, Kimberlé Crenshaw is 
persuaded that “there simply is no self-evident interpretation of civil rights 
inherent in the terms themselves,”67 but she finds the critique of rights 
“incomplete” because it fails “to appreciate fully the transformative significance 
of the civil rights movement in mobilizing Black Americans and generating 
new demands.”68 
 
 
59. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 23. 
60. Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 775. See generally Alan David Freeman, 
Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of 
Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978). 
61. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 275-76 (1990). 
62. Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 409 (1987) (footnote omitted). 
63. Id. at 410. 
64. Id. at 414. 
65. Id. at 425-26. 
66. See Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities 
Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301, 305 (1987) (“Rights do, at times, give pause to those 
who would otherwise oppress us.”). 
67. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra note 16, at 1344. 
68. Id. at 1356. 
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i i i .  the critique of rights,  applied to gideon  
A law review article called The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National 
Crisis begins with a series of stories in which criminal defendants were either 
denied lawyers or had bad lawyers.69 This part of the article is titled “How Can 
This Be Happening?”70 The critique of rights explains how. Using the five 
elements just described, this Part attempts to demonstrate that Gideon 
exemplifies the reasons for skepticism elucidated by the critique of rights. 
A. The Liberal Overinvestment in Rights 
 Gideon was decided during the 1960s, a period during which, according to 
Mark Tushnet, the Supreme Court took a “brief, perhaps aberrational, and 
sometimes overstated role . . . in advancing progressive goals.”71 Perhaps that 
was why it seemed, at the time, like a victory for the poor and minorities. 
Gideon was one of those classic Warren Court opinions that provided hope not 
just about criminal justice, but about economic and racial justice as well.72  
That hope is long gone. If Gideon was supposed to make the criminal justice 
system fairer for poor people and minorities, it has been a spectacular failure. 
The National Right to Counsel Committee, a panel that was created in 2004 to 
conduct a comprehensive survey of the state of indigent defense, reported:  
The right to counsel is now accepted as a fundamental precept of 
American justice. . . . Yet, today, in criminal and juvenile proceedings in 
state courts, sometimes counsel is not provided at all, and it often is 
supplied in ways that make a mockery of the great promise of the 
 
 
69. Backus & Marcus, supra note 20, at 1031. 
70. Id. at 1031. 
71. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 34. 
72. See Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, Foreword: The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 
86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1153 (1998) (“Law enforcement was a key instrument of racial repression, 
in both the North and the South, before the 1960’s civil rights revolution. Modern criminal 
procedure reflects the Supreme Court’s admirable contribution to eradicating this incidence 
of American apartheid.”); cf. Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal 
Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000) (describing the process by which egregious civil 
rights violations motivated by race have historically led the Supreme Court to refine 
constitutional criminal procedure). 
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Gideon decision and the Supreme Court’s soaring rhetoric.73  
Nancy Leong notes that Gideon has been “widely and accurately hailed as a 
milestone in protecting the rights of individual defendants.”74 This assertion is 
correct, as far as it goes. Gideon did protect the “rights” of defendants; it turns 
out, however, that protecting defendants’ rights is quite different from 
protecting defendants. Fifty years after Gideon, poor people have both the right 
to counsel and the most massive level of incarceration in the world.75 As stated 
earlier in this Essay, since Gideon, rates of incarceration (which, in the United 
States, applies mainly to the poor) and racial disparities have multiplied.76 The 
right to have a lawyer, at trial or even during the plea bargaining stage, has 
little impact on either of those central problems.  
What poor people, and black people, need from criminal justice is to be 
stopped less, arrested less, prosecuted less, incarcerated less. Considering other 
needs that poor people have—food and shelter—Mark Tushnet has stated, 
“[D]emanding that those needs be satisfied—whether or not satisfying them 
can today persuasively be characterized as enforcing a right—strikes me as 
more likely to succeed than claiming that existing rights to food and shelter 
must be enforced.”77  
On its face, the grant that Gideon provides poor people seems more than 
symbolic: it requires states to pay for poor people to have lawyers. But the 
implementation of Gideon suggests that the difference between symbolic and 
material rights might be more apparent than real. Indigent defense has been 
grossly underfunded, where it is provided at all. Moreover, even if the defender 
community were victorious in getting what it wanted out of Gideon—and the 
experience of the last fifty years suggests that it will not be—American criminal 
justice would still overpunish black and poor people. That is the unfairness 
that the liberal investment in Gideon was supposed to contravene. A lawyer is 
supposed to be a means to an end, not an end in herself. One problem with 
Gideon is that it makes the lawyer the end. Robert Gordon noted that “[f]ormal 
rights without practical enforceable content are easily substituted for real 
 
 
73. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 49, at 2. 
74. Nancy Leong, Gideon’s Law-Protective Function, 122 YALE L.J. 2460, 2462. 
75. See Gopnik, supra note 18 (stating that “[n]o other country even approaches” the U.S. 
incarceration rate). 
76. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text. 
77. Tushnet, supra note 50, at 1394. 
  
the yale law journal 122:2176   2013  
2192 
 
benefits.”78 In this sense Gideon and poor criminal defendants are friends 
without benefits.  
B. The Indeterminacy of Rights 
On every anniversary of Gideon, liberals bemoan the state of indigent 
defense. At its core, their claim is that Gideon has not been sufficiently 
enforced. Indeed, many people would agree that the right to counsel has been 
violated in cases where  
defense counsel slept during portions of the trial, where counsel used 
heroin and cocaine throughout the trial, where counsel allowed his 
client to wear the same sweatshirt and shoes in court that the 
perpetrator was alleged to have worn on the day of the crime, where 
counsel stated prior to trial that he was not prepared on the law or the 
facts of the case, and where counsel appointed in a capital case could 
not name a single Supreme Court decision on the death penalty.79  
As a practical matter, however, the right to counsel means whatever five or 
more members of the Supreme Court say it does (or what the social 
understanding of the right is80). In those cases, the Court found that the Sixth 
Amendment was not abridged.81 
 I was part of a team of lawyers that litigated a right-to-counsel case in 
Georgia. We alleged that, in capital cases, one county appointed counsel on the 
basis of a low-bidding system. The attorney who agreed to take the case for the 
least amount of money was the attorney that was appointed, without regard to 
her competency to represent a defendant in a death penalty case. The trial 
judge rejected our Sixth Amendment claim. I think we were right, and the trial 
judge was wrong. I understand, however, that there is no way of applying the 
Sixth Amendment’s words “in every prosecution, the accused shall enjoy the 
 
 
78. Gordon, supra note 57, at 657. 
79. COLE, supra note 42, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted). 
80. Though rights are analytically indeterminate, they may be culturally determined. For 
example, a “colored only” sign on a public schoolhouse door could be said to be 
unconstitutional, based on a cultural consensus about the Fourteenth Amendment, even if 
that understanding doesn’t necessarily follow from the text of the Amendment, and even if 
the Supreme Court were to declare legally segregated public schools to be constitutional.  
81. COLE, supra note 42, at 78-79. 
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right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence”82 to those facts and 
obtaining an answer that is objectively right or wrong.  
On one level the Gideon right is not abstract at all. It has a clear formal 
content: a person cannot be sentenced to prison unless she is represented by 
someone who is a member of the bar (or she waives this right). The problem is 
that the right can be respected without accomplishing anything, as in the 
above-described cases. In order to make the formal right meaningful, it must 
be supplemented by some sort of standard-like provisions. But doing so 
introduces a high level of abstraction that does not decide actual cases. 
For example, a New York Times article about the Frye and Lafler decisions 
that extended Gideon to the plea bargaining stage of the criminal process noted 
that “legal scholars . . . used words like ‘huge’ and ‘bold’ to describe” the 
decisions and quoted one legal scholar as saying, “I can’t think of another 
decision that’s had any bigger impact than these two are going to have over the 
next few years.”83 But the article goes on to state that “legal experts seem to 
agree . . . that it was difficult to gauge what concrete effect the rulings would 
have on everyday legal practice.”84 The Times quotes another legal scholar as 
predicting that the cases would lead to a “flurry” of court filings, “but [that] very 
few of them will succeed. . . . Courts are very good at tossing these cases out.”85 
Under one formulation, the critique of rights means that “rights cannot 
provide answers to real cases because they are cast at high levels of abstraction 
without clear application to particular problems.”86 In this light, the first 
recommendation of the National Right to Counsel Committee—that “[s]tates 
should adhere to their obligation to guarantee fair criminal and juvenile 
proceedings in compliance with constitutional requirements”—seems naïve.87 
Most states would say they are already in compliance with the Constitution. 
Yet commissions and panels in Georgia, Virginia, Louisiana, and Pennsylvania 
have opined that these states are not in compliance with Gideon.88 Even the 
 
 
82. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
83. Erica Goode, Stronger Hand for Judges in the ‘Bazaar’ of Plea Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.  
22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/us/stronger-hand-for-judges-after-rulings-on 
-plea-deals.html (quoting Professor Ronald F. Wright). 
84. Id. 
85. Id. (quoting Professor Stephanos Bibas). 
86. Critical Perspectives on Rights, supra note 56. 
87. NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., supra note 49, at 183. 
88. Backus & Marcus, supra note 20, at 1035-36. 
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U.S. Department of Justice has acknowledged that “indigent defense in the 
United States today is in a chronic state of crisis.”89 All of this sets up an 
extended, and furious, battle about what Gideon requires. The indigent defense 
community and the Supreme Court will agree sometimes, as in Frye and Lafler, 
and disagree other times, as in Pennsylvania v. Finley,90 where the Court held 
that a defendant has no right to counsel in habeas corpus proceedings, and 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli,91 where the Court held that a defendant has no absolute 
right to counsel at parole or probation revocation proceedings. Ultimately there 
are no “right” or “wrong” answers—an answer is “right” if it persuades a court. 
The vagaries of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the quality of lawyering 
that poor people are entitled to seem a risky foundation on which to position a 
social justice movement. 
C. Rights Discourse and Mystification 
American criminal justice is brutal, which is why the United States has the 
highest rate of incarceration in the world. This is what “law” does. The law 
allows the police to forcibly stop someone for running away from them in a 
high-crime neighborhood, even if the police have no other reason to suspect 
them of a crime.92 The law allows life imprisonment for a first-time drug 
offense.93 The law allows prosecutors to threaten someone with a life sentence 
for a minor crime unless he pleads guilty.94 
 Yet we celebrate Gideon as the “law.” That makes the law seem much more 
benign than it really is. Gideon’s announcement of a right to counsel appeared to 
give the poor an agency in criminal justice that they actually do not have. And its 
brutality would remain visited mainly on the poor. As Richard Delgado observed 
in 1985, when the prison population was less than half the size it is now: 
[O]f more than one million offenders entangled in the correctional 
system, the vast majority are members of the poorest class. Unless we 
 
 
89. OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS & BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, IMPROVING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEMS THROUGH EXPANDED STRATEGIES AND INNOVATIVE COLLABORATIONS, at ix 
(1999). 
90. 481 U.S. 551 (1987). 
91. 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
92. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
93. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
94. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). 
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are prepared to argue that offenders are poor because they are criminal, 
we should be open to the possibility that many turn to crime because of 
their poverty—that poverty is, for many, a determinant of criminal 
behavior.95  
 Imagine that many people charged with crimes are legally guilty, i.e., even 
if these defendants have excellent defense counsel, the prosecution still can 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they did what they are charged with 
doing. Gideon encourages us to think of this state of affairs as “fair.” Consistent 
with Peter Gabel’s and Jay Feinman’s description of contract law, Gideon 
“mask[s] the extent to which the social order makes it difficult to achieve true 
autonomy and solidarity” and “denies the oppressive nature of the existing 
hierarchies.”96 The progressive investment in Gideon and the movement 
building around the case makes it seem as though the “poverty and crime” 
conversation is about the right to a lawyer in a criminal case, and not about the 
kind of conduct that gets defined as crime, the racialized exercise of police 
discretion, or why punishment is the state’s central intervention for African-
American men. 
D. Isolated Individualism 
Gideon is a narrative about individual rights rather than a plea for class-
based or race-based relief. This is consistent with Wendy Brown’s observation 
that “rights discourse . . . . converts social problems into matters of 
individualized, dehistoricized injury and entitlement.”97 The Gideon narrative 
even comes with a creation myth—Gideon’s Trumpet, the book and movie98—
that focuses on the plucky Clarence Earl Gideon, who wrote his petition for 
cert on prison stationery, and once the Supreme Court awarded him his free 
lawyer, won his case with the jury deliberating for less than an hour! 
Mark Tushnet describes the “broad version” of the critique of rights as 
requiring the “undermining [of] the individualism that vindicating legal rights 
 
 
95. Delgado, supra note 33, at 10 (footnote omitted). 
96. Peter Gabel & Jay Feinman, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLITICS OF LAW, supra note 57, 
at 497, 498. 
97. WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 124 (1995). 
98. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON’S TRUMPET (1964); GIDEON’S TRUMPET (Hallmark Hall of Fame 
Productions 1980).  
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reinforces.”99 Gideon instructs us that we should respond to the problem that 
eighty percent of people charged with crimes in the U.S. are poor by trying to 
get a lawyer for a poor person charged with a crime.100 This will not solve the 
problem. Then, of all the actors in the criminal justice system against whom 
defendants might have a gripe, Gideon tells us it should be against the lawyers 
who represent them.101 Gideon diffuses solidarity among the 2.3 million people 
in the United States who are incarcerated. It changes the subject from mass 
incarceration and racial subordination to private entitlement. 
E. Rights Discourse as an Impediment to Progressive Social Movements 
Gideon diverts attention from economic and racial critiques of the criminal 
justice system. For example, this Essay appears in a Symposium issue of The 
Yale Law Journal that observes the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon. The Yale Law 
Journal has not devoted an entire issue to mass incarceration or racial 
disparities in criminal justice. To the extent that some essays in the symposium 
make racial critiques of American criminal justice, their authors, like me, must 
situate those critiques within a discussion of Gideon and explain why the 
critiques are still salient in light of Gideon.102 I do not think those tasks are 
difficult, as this Essay hopefully demonstrates, but they do take time and 
attention from the main problems—mass incarceration and racial disparities. 
To the extent that scholarship makes any difference, the poor would be better 
served by my learned coauthors and our able student editors focused explicitly 
on ending those problems, as opposed to devoting hundreds of pages and work 
hours analyzing why Gideon has not worked, or how it might work better. It’s 
rather like a conference of esteemed scientists convening to discuss why holy 
water does not cure cancer. Something interesting might come out of it, but 
 
 
99. Tushnet, supra note 2, at 27. 
100. See supra note 20. 
101. U.S. District Judge Jed Rakoff makes a related point about the Supreme Court’s decisions in 
Frye and Lafler. He notes that “most of the unfairness that occurs during the plea-bargaining 
process is, in my experience, not the result of defense counsel’s ineffectiveness. Instead,  
it is the result of overconfidence on the part of the prosecutors . . . .” Jed. S. Rakoff,  
Frye and Lafler: Bearers of Mixed Messages, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 25, 26 (2012), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/18/rakoff.html. 
102. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236 
(2013); David Patton, Federal Public Defense in An Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578 (2013). 
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the public interest might be more efficiently served by focusing on an actual 
cure. 
In addition to its diversion function, Gideon also provides a legitimation of 
the status quo. As discussed in Part I, the poor—especially the poor and 
black—are incarcerated at exponentially greater levels now than when Gideon 
was decided. If more poor people are represented by lawyers because of Gideon, 
arguably their trials or plea bargains are fairer than before Gideon, when they 
did not have lawyers. Thus, the poor have simultaneously received a fairer 
process and more punishment. Gideon makes it more work—and thus more 
difficult—to make economic and racial critiques of criminal justice. This is not 
to say people cannot and do not make those claims, but rather that Gideon 
makes their arguments less persuasive. It creates a formal equality between the 
rich and the poor because now they both have lawyers. The vast 
overrepresentation of the poor in America’s prisons appears more like a 
narrative about personal responsibility than an indictment of criminal justice. 
In the words of one commentator, “Procedural fairness not only produces faith 
in the outcome of individual trials; it reinforces faith in the legal system as a 
whole.”103  
If prosecutors had brought most of their cases against the poor during the 
pre-Gideon era when most indigent defendants did not have lawyers, 
prosecutors would have looked like bullies. Since Gideon, the percentage of 
prosecutions against the poor has increased from 43% to 80%.104 American 
prosecutors have so much discretion, and there are so many criminal laws, that 
they can bring a case against virtually whomever they choose.105 Prosecutors 
 
 
103. Michael O’Donnell, Crime and Punishment: On William Stuntz, NATION, Jan. 10, 2012, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/165569/crime-and-punishment-william-stuntz. 
104. See Stuntz, supra note 17, at 7 n.7. 
105. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“With the law 
books filled with a great assortment of crimes, a prosecutor stands a fair chance of finding at 
least a technical violation of some act on the part of almost anyone. In such a case, it is not a 
question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for the man who has 
committed it, it is a question of picking the man and then searching the law books, or 
putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him. It is in this realm—in which the 
prosecutor picks some person whom he dislikes or desires to embarrass, or selects some 
group of unpopular persons and then looks for an offense, that the greatest danger of abuse 
of prosecuting power lies. It is here that law enforcement becomes personal, and the real 
crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant or governing group . . . .” 
(quoting Attorney General [and future Supreme Court Justice] Robert H. Jackson, The 
Federal Prosecutor, Address at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys 
(Apr. 1, 1940), in 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 3, 5 (1940))). 
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have mostly chosen the poor, but now, because of Gideon, they look like less 
like bullies. 
The critique of rights posits that “rights discourse contributes to passivity, 
alienation, and a sense of inevitability about the way things are.”106 Gideon 
encourages the view that fairness for poor people is an issue of criminal 
procedure, not criminal law.107 When it establishes a procedural right, and the 
poor and racial minorities still complain, mass incarceration and racial 
disparities start to seem inevitable. When the problem is lack of a right, one 
keeps going to court until a court declares the right. When the problem is 
material deprivation suffered on the basis of race and class, where, exactly, does 
one go for the fix? The Conclusion of this Essay recommends some places. 
In applying the critique of rights to Gideon, I do not want to discount the 
important concerns raised by some critical race theorists. The critical race 
response to the critique of rights exhibits a discordant duality about rights that 
in some ways accords with this Essay’s analysis of Gideon. As described in Part 
II, critical race theorists posit that rights are unstable and incoherent but still 
might be good for people of color. This Essay suggests that Gideon is 
profoundly limited and limiting, and yet a force for certain sources of good (for 
example, Gideon authorizes the office of the public defender in Philadelphia 
that, compared to appointed counsel, gets shorter sentences for its clients108). 
Even more significantly, Gideon may save the lives of defendants in capital 
cases, who, occasionally, get better lawyers than they would in a world without 
Gideon. 
iv.  other comments on rights discourse in criminal 
procedure 
Other scholars have also noted the limits of criminal procedural rights to 
establish racial or social justice. I note three influential analyses of criminal 
procedure that accord in some ways with this Essay’s application of the critique 
of rights to Gideon (and in other ways diverge). Professors Louis Michael 
Seidman, Michael Klarman, and William Stuntz have each observed the failure 
 
 
106. Critical Perspectives on Rights, supra note 56. 
107. Stuntz, supra note 17, at 72 (“Why has constitutional law focused so heavily on criminal 
procedure, and why has it so strenuously avoided anything to do with substantive criminal 
law  . . . ?”). 
108. See Anderson & Heaton, supra note 43. 
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of criminal rights discourse, in specific contexts, to improve fairness in criminal 
justice. 
In Brown and Miranda,109 Professor Seidman examined the meaning of two 
of the most famous Supreme Court decisions: Brown v. Board of Education110 
and Miranda v. Arizona.111 Seidman argues that, contrary to conventional 
understanding, “the decisions did not mandate a vast restructuring of power 
relationships. Rather, the decisions have served to justify and legitimate 
arrangements that would otherwise be severely threatened by constitutional 
rhetoric.”112 He believes that both decisions “served to stabilize and legitimate 
the status quo by creating the illusion of closure and cohesion.”113 
For Miranda, specifically, Seidman posits that there is “a good deal of 
evidence that Miranda, like Brown, traded the promise of substantial reform 
implicit in prior doctrine for a political symbol.”114 He acknowledges “some 
truth”115 to the claim that the decision, which requires that the police advise 
suspects in custody of their privilege against self-incrimination, empowers 
individuals who are subject to police questioning. But Seidman notes that the 
Court had, in a series of cases decided prior to Miranda, already held that the 
people subject to interrogation while in custody had the right to counsel.116 
Miranda’s real purpose was to articulate a mechanism for waiver of the right.117 
Citing data that suggests that Miranda did not decrease the number of 
defendants who confess, Seidman questions whether, for criminal suspects, 
“Miranda is serving any useful purpose.”118 
While Seidman does not explicitly invoke the critique of rights, his analysis 
is consistent with its view that rights discourse does not necessarily lead to 
social change, and that it may impede social justice. In Miranda, he states, “the 
Court tamed the contradictions that would otherwise continually threaten the 
 
 
109. Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1992). 
110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
111. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
112. Seidman, supra note 109, at 680. 
113. Id. at 719. 
114. Id. at 746. 
115. Id. at 743. 
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legitimacy of punishment in a liberal democracy.”119 He adds that 
Brown and Miranda created a world where we need no longer be 
concerned about inequality because the races are now definitionally 
equal and a world where we need no longer be concerned about official 
coercion because defendants have definitionally consented to their 
treatment. . . . Brown and Miranda let us blame the victim in a way we 
never could under the old regime.120 
The two decisions diffuse the dissent that might be expected by the existence of 
a permanent racially defined underclass because they provide an “amusement-
park version of social change.”121 
In The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure,122 Professor Michael 
Klarman links the development of constitutional criminal procedure to an 
effort by the Supreme Court to advance racial justice in the South in the era 
before World War II. He examines four landmark cases in which the Supreme 
Court held that convictions obtained in mob-dominated trials violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law, established a right to 
counsel in capital cases, invalidated a conviction because blacks had been 
intentionally excluded from the jury, and declared that the right to due process 
made confessions based on torture inadmissible.123 
According to Klarman, “none of these rulings had a very significant direct 
impact on Jim Crow justice. For example, few blacks sat on southern juries as a 
result of Norris v. Alabama, and black defendants continued to be tortured into 
confessing, notwithstanding Brown v. Mississippi.”124 Klarman diverges from 
the critique of rights, however, in his hopeful analysis of the indirect effects of 
the cases. He advances the possibility that these cases were “more important 
for their intangible effects: convincing blacks that the racial status quo was not 
impervious to change; educating them about their rights providing a rallying 
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point around which to organize a protest movement; and perhaps even 
instructing oblivious whites as to the egregious nature of Jim Crow 
conditions.”125 
Finally, Professor William Stuntz noticed certain “perverse”126 effects of 
criminal procedure: as rights have expanded, things have gotten worse for 
accused persons. Specifically, “underfunding, overcriminalization, and 
oversentencing have increased as criminal procedure has expanded.”127 The 
problem is that actors in the criminal justice system can respond to judicial 
declarations of rights “in ways other than obeying them.”128 States reacted to 
Warren Court criminal procedure holdings by making the substantive criminal 
law more punitive, to compensate for the rights provided to accused persons. 
The result was that criminal cases were focused on procedure. Stuntz believes 
that this caused American criminal justice to “unravel.”129 Rather than focus on 
procedural rights, the Warren Court should have used “the federal Bill of 
Rights . . . to advance some coherent vision of fair and equal criminal 
justice.”130 Stuntz’s critique is not so much a critique of rights as a critique of 
the Court’s reliance on procedural rights specifically. 131 
One lesson we might garner from these three commentators is that 
procedural rights may be especially prone to legitimate the status quo, because 
“fair” process masks unjust substantive outcomes and makes those outcomes 
seem more legitimate. In contrast, a right to a minimum wage, while it may 
legitimate unequal distribution of wealth, substantively improves the condition 
of the least well-off in material ways. 
conclusion: critical tactics 
According to David Cole, “the most troubling lesson of the more than 
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thirty-five years since Gideon v. Wainwright is that neither the Supreme Court 
nor the public appears to have any interest in making the constitutional right 
announced in Gideon a reality.”132 This should not have come as a surprise. The 
real surprise is the continued investment in rights discourse.  
Duncan Kennedy observes that “critique is always motivated.”133 My 
motivation in applying the critique of rights to Gideon is to cause people who 
want to reform, or transform, American criminal justice to recalibrate their 
methods.  
First, I want to be especially clear on one point. People should still become 
criminal defense attorneys. The most important good that defense attorneys do 
is helping individual clients. Reducing potential sentences by six months, as 
one study suggests that effective defense counsel can, makes an enormous 
difference in the lives of incarcerated people and their families.134 Effective 
defense attorneys can also increase the cost of prosecution, and, in theory, this 
has the potential to reduce mass incarceration on a macro level. Excellent 
defense attorneys might disrupt one or more steps of the five-step process 
described in Part II by which the criminal law establishes control over poor 
people. For example, disproportionate stops and arrests of poor African 
Americans might be inhibited by aggressive litigation. 
Thus, defense attorneys should continue to fight for the resources that they 
need to effectively represent their clients.135 But everyone should understand, 
first, that those resources are not likely to result from raising Gideon-based 
claims in court, and second, that Gideon has not, and will not, change the fact 
that in American criminal justice, poor people are losers. 
The idea of abandoning rights discourse is not as radical as it sounds; 
rather, it is consistent with the disillusionment, especially on the Left, about 
the value of going to courts to resolve claims of racial or economic injustice. 
Professors Cummings and Eagly have described “a new orthodoxy that is 
deeply skeptical of the usefulness of legal strategies to promote social 
change.”136 
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So what should people do? I am less certain about what methods will 
transform criminal justice than I am certain that Gideon discourse will not. I do 
not view that uncertainty as a flaw in my thesis.137 If people believe that holy 
water cures cancer, it is a contribution to demonstrate that it does not, even if 
one does not himself have an actual cure to offer. Thus, rather than profess 
absolute remedies to mass incarceration and racial disparities, I can offer a few 
tentative suggestions on how criminal reformers can, in hip-hop parlance, “act 
like they know” that rights discourse does not work.138 
Mark Tushnet notes that proceeding with an awareness of the critique of 
rights allows progressives “to improve the accuracy of the calculation of the 
possible benefit of investing in legal action rather than in something else—
street demonstrations, public opinion campaigns, or whatever.”139 In the 
criminal justice context, the goal is to prevent poor people and African 
Americans from being losers in criminal justice, or at least from losing as badly 
as they do now. Advocates for the poor, for racial minorities, and for criminal 
defendants should abandon rights discourse and rather focus on reducing the 
number of poor people overall, and African Americans specifically, who are 
incarcerated.  
The two apparatuses that bear the most responsibility for the massive 
increase in incarceration and racial disparities since Gideon are the “war on 
drugs” and the “tough-on-crime” movement. Legalizing or decriminalizing 
drugs would do some work toward reducing both incarceration overall, and the 
racial disparities (or, for the latter, at least bring them closer to the two-to-one 
disparity that existed before the war on drugs, as opposed to the seven-to-one 
disparity that now exists).140 
The 2.3 million people who are locked up in the United States, and their 
families and friends, have the potential to form a huge social movement against 
mass incarceration. The critique of rights suggests that historians or political 
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scientists are better consultants than lawyers in fashioning the best methods for 
achieving this goal. One animating question might be: What was responsible 
for social justice advances, like emancipation, that resulted in material gains for 
African Americans and the poor? 
Michelle Alexander has proposed that as many criminal defendants as 
possible go to trial in an effort to “crash the justice system.”141 The idea is to 
create chaos in the criminal justice system to make ending mass incarceration a 
priority for politicians and to force a public conversation about it. In other 
work I have recommended jury nullification as a way of reducing the number 
of people who are incarcerated for nonviolent, victimless crime.142 
Some efforts are already underway. In New York, there have been public 
demonstrations and civil disobedience to reduce excessive law enforcement in 
minority communities, especially the police practice of “stop, question, and 
frisk.”143 A group called Critical Resistance is one of the leaders of the prison 
abolition project to reduce the reliance on incarceration.144 All of Us or None is 
an organization of formerly incarcerated people working to end discrimination 
against people with conviction histories.145 These efforts provide limited 
optimism that if criminal justice reformers focus on reducing incarceration 
rather than increasing rights, the poor can lose less. 
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